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Abstract According to rationalists, synthetic a priori propositions convey new 
knowledge, whereas analytic propositions are non-informative or vacuous conceptual 
truths. However, as we argue in this article, each a priori proposition is necessarily 
true because of its semantic constituents and the way they are combined, and hence 
can be transformed into its equivalent analytic form. So each synthetic a priori 
proposition conveys only non-informative conceptual truths like analytic propositions. 
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1.Introduction 
In the literature, there are three distinctions proposed for propositions. The first one is 
a metaphysical distinction, namely necessary/contingent distinction. A proposition is 
necessarily true (false) if it is true (false) in all possible worlds. For example, the 
tautology “φ∨∼φ” is necessarily true, and “∼(φ∨∼φ)” is necessarily false. By 
contrast, a proposition is contingent if it is true in at least one possible world and false 
in at least one possible world. For example, “all swans are white” is a contingent 
proposition. 
The second one is an epistemological distinction, namely a priori/a posteriori 
distinction. A proposition is a priori proposition if it can be known independent of 
any experience. For example, “all bachelors are unmarried”, “φ∨∼φ”, and “5+7=12”. 
A proposition is a posteriori proposition if it cannot be known independent of 
experience. For example, “all bachelors are rich”, and “it is raining outside the 
window”. They are true or false because of confirmation/disconfirmation, or 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction, by empirical evidence. 
The third one is a linguistic distinction, namely analytic/synthetic distinction, 
introduced by Kant (1781, A6-A7). A proposition is analytic if and only if its 
predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this 
concept A. And a proposition is synthetic if and only if its predicate B is not (covertly) 
contained in the subject A but adds something new to the subject. For example, “all 
women are female” is an analytic proposition, but “all women are beautiful” is a 
synthetic proposition. Since analytic propositions don‟t give us any knowledge or 
information about the world, they are non-informative or vacuous, and convey only 
conceptual truths. However, for each synthetic proposition its predicate is not 
contained in the subject but adds something new to the subject. So synthetic 
propositions seem to be informative or non-vacuous. 
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Combining synthetic proposition with a priori proposition, Kant proposes one kind 
of propositions, namely synthetic a priori propositions, that may begin with 
experience but do not arise from experience. For example, “5+7=12” seems to be a 
synthetic a priori proposition, because at the first glance the concept „12‟ doesn‟t 
seem to be already contained in the concept „5+7‟. Besides, some philosophers also 
accept “the shortest distance between two points is a straight line” as a synthetic a 
priori proposition. Since for each synthetic a priori proposition its predicate cannot be 
contained in the subject but adds something new to the subject, it seems to be 
informative or non-vacuous, and conveys new knowledge. 
In the literature, there are many disputes on the possibility of synthetic a priori 
propositions. According to rationalists, in metaphysics and mathematics there are 
some propositions that are necessarily true and convey new knowledge. They are not 
empirical like a posteriori propositions, but informative like synthetic a priori 
propositions. However, all forms of empiricism reject the existence of synthetic a 
priori propositions (Feigl 1947). For example, M. Schilick argues that “all 
propositions are either synthetic a posteriori or tautologous; synthetic a priori 
propositions seem to it to be a logical impossibility.” (Schlick 2012) G. Frege and A. J. 
Ayer also argues that arithmetic propositions like “5+7=12” are analytic a priori, 
rather than synthetic a priori, propositions (Katz 2000; Ayer 2001). For more 
discussions, see (Coleman 1979; Copi 1949,1950; Felch 1950; Glassen 1958; 
Hintikka 1968; Langford 1949; Johnson 1960; Krishna 1961; Morawetz 1974; Pap 
1950; Sellars 1953; Turquette 1950). If empiricism is correct, then it seems to 
eliminate metaphysics. So the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions is vital for 
metaphysics. 
As we know, there are already so many debates on this problem. However, many of 
them are quite misleading because of a wrong presupposition, namely an a priori 
proposition is synthetic if and only if it is informative or conveys new knowledge}. 
Hence, we will argue as follows that: there are some synthetic a priori propositions, 
but all a priori propositions are non-informative and convey only conceptual truths as 
analytic propositions.  
2.All a priori propositions are non-informative 
For the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions, we need only to find some a 
priori propositions whose predicates cannot be contained in their subjects. For 
example, “1∈{1,2,3}” is a synthetic a priori proposition. Firstly, it is obvious that “1
∈ {1,2,3}” is an a priori proposition. Secondly, “1∈ {1,2,3}” is a synthetic 
proposition. Because the predicate “{1,2,3}” cannot be contained in the natural 
number “1”; otherwise, there would be infinite number of predicates, such as 
“{1,2,4}”, “{1,3,4}”, “{1,3,4,5}”, etc., contained in the single number “1”. And that 
will be absurd! Hence, there are some synthetic a priori propositions. 
Is “1∈{1,2,3}” informative, or does it convey new knowledge? Since “1∈{1,2,3}” 
is equivalent to “{1,2,3} contains 1”, if one of them is informative, then so is the other. 
And, clearly, “{1,2,3} contains 1” is analytic or non-informative. Hence, “1∈{1,2,3}” 
is only one conceptual truth, rather than conveying new knowledge. From the 
example, we know that some synthetic a priori propositions have some kind of 
equivalent analytic form, and hence are non-informative. Now we have a question: are 
there any synthetic a priori, or a priori, propositions which are informative or convey 
new knowledge? We will argue in the following that: each a priori proposition is 
equivalent to an analytic proposition, and hence non-informative. 
Let φ be an a priori proposition. Then φ can be known independent of any possible 
experience. It means that φ can be derived from some a priori epistemic reasons 
which can also be known independent of any possible experience. Then there is, in 
principle, an ideal set (denoted by O) of all a priori epistemic reasons for φ such that 
the conjunction of all O‟s members, denoted by Ω, is equivalent to φ. Because there is 
no need of other unnecessary reasons for φ‟s justification. In other words, if φ can be 
derived from Ω, but not vice versa, then O must contain some members which cannot 
be derived from φ. And these members must contain some information which is not 
contained in φ. So this information is irrelevant and unnecessary for φ‟s justification, 
and it should be cut off. Hence, to justify φ, we only need to find this kind of ideal set 
of all a priori epistemic reasons for φ. Since every O‟s member is a priori epistemic 
reason for φ, Ω‟s truth value is also independent of any possible experience. Now 
suppose that: there is ψ∈O such that 
(1). τ is one of ψ‟s a priori epistemic reasons, 
(2). τ doesn‟t contain any information which is unnecessary for ψ‟s justification, 
(3). τ∉O. 
From ψ∈O and the clause (1), we know that τ is also one of φ‟s a priori epistemic 
reasons. Then from O‟s definition and the clause (2), we have τ∈O. Contradiction. 
So the supposition is false. No O‟s member can have any a priori epistemic reason, 
which is not in O but contains only the information necessary for the justification of 
the member. So Ω‟s truth value doesn‟t depend on any other a priori epistemic reason 
which is not in O. Since Ω‟s truth value is also independent of any possible 
experience, its truth value depends only on the proposition Ω itself, namely its 
semantic constituents and the way they are combined. Hence, φ‟s truth value depends 
only on the proposition φ itself. It means that φ‟s semantic constituents and the way 
they are combined are enough to determine its truth. Therefore, the essence for a 
proposition to be a priori or independent of any possible experience is that its truth 
value depends only on the proposition itself. 
Since φ‟s truth depends only upon the proposition itself, no matter which situation 
or possible world it is in, it is true by itself, namely it is necessarily true by itself. 
From φ‟s necessary truth, we know that ∼φ is false in all logically possible worlds. 
Since the only difference between φ and ∼φ is that ∼φ has one more negation (a truth 
function), ∼φ‟s universal falsity is also determined by itself. In other words, its 
semantic constituents and the way they are combined are also enough to determine its 
falsity, or in other words, prevent it from being true in any logically possible worlds. 
What is the intrinsic reason in ∼φ for its necessary/universal falsity? The only reason 
is that ∼φ itself must be inconsistent. By reductio ad absurdum, suppose that ∼φ is 
consistent or doesn‟t contain any conceptual contradiction. Then it can be true for 
several reasons as follows. 
(1). In logic, every consistent proposition is satisfiable in some assignments of truth 
value, interpretations, or logically possible worlds. 
(2). If a proposition doesn‟t contain any kind of conceptual contradiction, then it is 
logically conceivable to be true in some possible situations. 
(3). If ∼φ is consistent, then some parts of the universe are, in principle, possible to 
evolve into a future world where ∼φ is true in it. 
(4). If ∼φ is consistent, then God can, in principle, design a possible world or future 
world where ∼φ is true, provided that God exists. 
In a word, there is no reason which can prevent a consistent proposition ∼φ from 
being true in some logically possible worlds. So, to know whether φ is true, we need 
to know first which situation or possible/future world it is in. Then φ cannot be 
necessarily true, and is not a priori. Contradiction. So the supposition is false, ∼φ 
itself must be inconsistent. 
Since ∼φ is inconsistent, there is a proposition ψ such that ∼φ entails ψ∧∼ψ. As 
∼φ may contain more information or semantic contents other than ψ∧∼ψ, let ∼φ↔ψ
∧∼ψ∧τ, where τ denotes ∼φ‟s remaining information except ψ∧∼ψ. Hence, we 
have  
φ↔∼(ψ∧∼ψ∧τ) 
   ↔∼((ψ∧τ)∧∼ψ) 
↔(ψ∧τ) →ψ 
Obviously, (ψ∧ τ)→ψ is an analytic proposition. Therefore, every a priori 
proposition is equivalent to an analytic proposition. Since the formal transformation 
above only changes the logical form of a priori proposition, each synthetic a priori 
proposition can be different from its analytic form only in the aspect of its logical 
form. Hence, each synthetic a priori proposition cannot be more informative than its 
analytic form. Therefore, each a priori proposition cannot be informative or convey 
new knowledge, but is only one conceptual truth like analytic propositions. 
Take “5+7=12” for example. Its semantic constituents and the way they are 
combined are enough to determine its truth. So it is necessarily true by itself. And 
then its negation “5+7≠12” is necessarily false by itself. So “5+7≠12” must contain a 
conceptual contradiction; otherwise, it is consistent, and then satisfiable in some 
logically possible worlds. What is the contradiction in “5+7≠12”? From the concepts 
„5‟, „+‟, „7‟, and „12‟, we know that the left side of „≠‟ outputs 12. However, the 
proposition claims that the result is not 12. That is the conceptual contradiction. So 
“5+7=12” is only a negation of a conceptual contradiction, and it is non-informative 
but only one conceptual truth. Moreover, “5+7=12” means the same as 
“|||||+|||||||=||||||||||||”. Since the symbol „+‟ just means to put two numbers together, 
“|||||+|||||||” is the same as “||||| |||||||”. So „+‟ is a redundant symbol in this terminology. 
And hence the predicate “||||||||||||” contains in the subject “||||| |||||||”. The abbreviation 
symbols in “5+7=12” conceal its analytic essence. 
But why do some a priori propositions in mathematics and metaphysics seem to be 
informative? We think the main reasons are as follows. Firstly, since those 
propositions may involve various abstract or complex concepts and logical forms, we 
may not aware of all their essential details during our understanding process. 
Secondly, even if we can do that, we cannot know their a priori relations through 
simple conceptual analysis. So we are apt to think of them as conveying new 
knowledge that cannot be known by conceptual analysis. Take “the shortest distance 
between two points is a straight line” for example. At the first glance, we are not 
aware of the conceptual relation between the concepts “distance” and “straight line”. 
Even if we know that the concept of “distance” is defined on the basis of the concept 
of “straight line”, we cannot know their a priori relations through simple conceptual 
analysis. That is the reason why we consider it as informative or conveying new 
knowledge that cannot be known by conceptual analysis. 
In contrast, if the concepts and logical forms involving in an a priori proposition 
are simple or not abstract, then we may aware of their essential details, and hence 
know their simple a priori relations through simple conceptual analysis. After that, we 
are apt to regard the proposition as vacuous, or non-informative, conceptual truth. For 
example, “a cube has 12 edges” and “a triangle has 3 edges”. During our 
understanding process of the two propositions, we are aware of the essential details of 
the concepts of cube, triangle, and edge. From these concepts we conclude that if an 
object doesn‟t have 12 (or 3) edges, then it can‟t be a cube (or triangle). So, obviously 
and trivially, a cube (or triangle) has 12 (or 3) edges. That is why we regard them as 
vacuous or non-informative. 
Some rationalists may reply that: the two simple propositions in last paragraph are 
non-informative because they are analytic; if they were synthetic propositions, then 
they would be informative. Obviously, the above example involving “1∈{1,2,3}” 
and “{1,2,3} contains 1” is a counter example of these points of view. Besides, 
suppose that they are right. As we know, “ 144 edges” and “ 27 edges” cannot be 
contained in the subjects “a cube” and “a triangle” respectively; otherwise, “ 1728”, 
“ 20736”, etc., and “ 9”, “ 81”, etc., are contained in the subjects “a cube” and “a 
triangle” respectively. That is absurd! So “a cube has  144 edges” and “a triangle has 
 27 edges” are both synthetic. Then from the supposition above we know that they 
are both informative. However, they are, in fact, equivalent to “a cube has 12 edges” 
and “a triangle has 3 edges” respectively. It follows that the former two cannot be 
more informative than the latter two respectively. 
In fact, no matter simple or complex a priori propositions, the a priori relations 
among the concepts involving in them, in essence, are of the same kind. They are just 
conceptual truths, namely negations of some conceptual contradictions, determined 
by the concepts involving in them and the way they are combined. How can one kind 
of conceptual truths (like “1∈{1,2,3}”) be more informative than the other kind (like 
“{1,2,3} contains 1”)? 
3. Conclusion 
As we show above, there are some synthetic a priori propositions. However, as we 
argue, they don‟t convey any new knowledge. The main reason is that: each a priori 
proposition is necessarily true because of its semantic constituents and the way they 
are combined, and hence can be transformed into its equivalent analytic form. So each 
a priori proposition is just a conceptual truth which is non-informative or vacuous 
like analytic propositions. Besides, the reason for regarding synthetic a priori 
propositions as informative is that the concepts and logical forms involving in them 
are too abstract or complex for us to reveal their conceptual essence through simple 
conceptual analysis. 
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